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Structural asymmetries at the roots of the eurozone 
crisis: whatÕs new for industrial policy in the EU? 
 
ALBERTO BOTTA* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Several economists describe the eurozone crisis in terms of three 
main facts. First, before the 2007-2008 financial crash, the process of 
monetary and financial integration allowed most peripheral eurozone 
countries to benefit from considerable capital inflows (Perez-Caldentey 
and Vernengo, 2012). Accordingly, their economies expanded rapidly, 
often faster than central economies, giving rise to a sort of centre-
periphery convergence (see figure A.1 in the appendix to the paper). 
Housing booms took place in Ireland, Spain and (to a lesser extent) 
Greece in the first half of the 2000s, and increasing external imbalances 
emerged much in the same way as they did historically in several 
developing countries after financial liberalisation (Stockhammer, 2012).1 
Second, the worldwide financial dislocation induced by the subprime 
crisis threw all of the eurozone into a deep recession, forcing national 
governments to come in to bail out close-to-bankruptcy private financial 
institutions and provide relief against recession. A prevalently private 
sector problem became a public concern (De Grauwe, 2010). The loss of 
monetary sovereignty by eurozone countries constitutes the third piece of 
the story, since it has increased the fear of sovereign debt default and the 
floor to speculative attacks, as well as capital flights away from 
externally indebted peripheral countries. 
Despite the external and exogenous origin of the crisis as due to 
the ‘imported’ consequences of the subprime crisis, part of the above 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
* University of Reggio Calabria, email: abotta@eco.unipv.it. I am indebted to Clara 
Capelli, Giulia Canzian, Roberto Gabriele, Enrico Zaninotto, Silvio Beretta, Renata Lenti 
Targetti and two anonymous referees whose comments have significantly improved 
previous versions of this paper. Any remaining errors are mine. 
1 See figure A.3 in the appendix on this point. 
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problems have a domestic endogenous nature linked to long-lasting 
structural asymmetries between peripheral and central economies. 
According to the most recent European Commission Industrial 
Structure Report (2013), Greece and Portugal stand out as relatively 
closed economies (at least compared to other small European 
countries), and are characterised by poorly diversified productive and 
export structures. Perhaps more relevantly, their economies are 
concentrated in resource-intensive and labour-intensive low-tech 
sectors that provide scarce opportunities for introducing product and 
process innovation. In the case of Ireland, the development of a 
restricted bunch of high-tech industries has fed past remarkable 
growth performances. This fact notwithstanding, its dynamic export 
sector is scarcely integrated with the rest of the economy, and a 
relatively small part of Irish exports’ value effectively originates 
inside the Irish economy (European Commission, 2013; Foster et al., 
2013). Further, the Irish productive system is still affected by a lack of 
diversification, this fact being strikingly evident when capital goods 
sectors are considered.2 Larger peripheral countries such as Italy and 
Spain are characterised by more variegated productive and export 
structures compared to small economies. Yet, in the case of Italy in 
particular, traditional low-tech and poorly innovative sectors still 
represent a relevant part of their productive systems. Central eurozone 
countries present a different picture. In the case of Germany, in 
particular, a well-diversified productive and export structure is deeply 
integrated inside the domestic economy, and shows relative 
comparative advantages in medium/high-tech sectors with supposedly 
strong potential for innovation and growth. Given these structural 
features, finance-led growth accelerations have led peripheral 
countries to run considerable external imbalances, hence their 
mounting external debts, vis-à-vis more developed central economies, 
by violating rather tight balance-of-payments constraints (Hein et al., 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2 See also Best (2013) for a critical assessment of FDI-centred industrial policies followed 
by the Irish government as to their effects on the Irish productive system’s dynamism and 
capability to undertake indigenous R&D and innovation. 
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2011).3 Soon after the outbreak of the worldwide financial crisis, such 
asymmetries, coupled with opposite financial positions on capital 
markets, capital flights away from the periphery and diverging post-
crisis macroeconomic environments (interest rate hikes, credit crunch 
and tough austerity programs mainly concentrated in the periphery) all 
(inter-)acted to transform a common symmetric shock (i.e. the 2007-
2008 financial meltdown) into asymmetric scenarios: a quick export-
led recovery in the centre versus deepening and protracted recession in 
the periphery.4 
In some previous contributions, we have shown that expansionary 
fiscal policies implemented by a monetarily sovereign eurozone 
central government, possibly funded by issuing Eurobonds, would 
likely represent the definitive way out of the crisis (Botta, 2013; 
2014). Indeed, expansionary fiscal policies implemented by a federal 
euro government may favour economic recovery in the periphery, and 
avoid financial instability from spreading into the entire monetary 
union. In these contributions, we mainly focused on the short-run anti-
cyclical nature of expansionary measures. Here we move to consider 
how short-run and long-run goals (i.e. reductions in centre-periphery 
structural asymmetries) could be jointly pursued through industrial 
policies that support productive investment, hence effective demand 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3 According to data from UNCTAD, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal recorded 
remarkable and increasing trade account deficits vis-à-vis Germany since the end of the 
1990s and until 2008. Before the outbreak of the present crisis, trade deficits versus 
Germany were as high as 2.13 and 2.22 percent of GDP in the case of Portugal and Spain, 
respectively (around 1 percent in the case of Italy and Greece). In the case of Ireland, 
relevant trade account surpluses registered in the second half of the 1990s were driven 
close to zero just before the outbreak of the worldwide financial meltdown. More 
generally, in the case of Ireland relevant trade surpluses have not been enough to 
compensate for a worsening and overall (pre-crisis) negative current account position due 
to large profit repatriation by foreign multinationals. According to Capelli and Vaggi 
(2013), profit repatriations made Irish GNP lower than Irish GDP by more than 20 
percentage points in 2013. 
4 In light of these facts, the hypothesis of the endogenous nature of the eurozone as an 
optimal currency area is no longer credible (see Frankel and Rose, 1998 on the idea of 
endogenous monetary areas; see also De Grauwe and Mongelli, 2005 for an application of 
this concept to the eurozone). 
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and economic recovery, and stimulate the long-run growth potential of 
peripheral countries. 
In this paper, we take into account a wide range of policies, from 
more ‘traditional’ industrial measures influencing industrial and 
productive dynamics, to public involvement in research and development 
(R&D) activities. Nevertheless, they all depend on three main strategic 
actions. First, a euro-funded industrial policy should considerably 
increase expenditures devoted to basic research carried out through high-
level education institutions. Indeed, according to Dosi et al. (2006), while 
these efforts are fundamental to expand the scientific knowledge with 
which applied innovations can be carried out, they also create a 
‘business-friendly’ environment and are most welcomed by private 
corporations. Second, alongside basic research, public-private research 
centres should strengthen R&D networks in national innovation systems 
and focus on applied applications of the above knowledge. Last, but not 
least, the emergence of innovative firms should be stimulated through 
public support, let us say subsidies, fiscal incentives and/or the direct 
public procurement and financing of innovations. In this regard, sectoral 
policies should be reconsidered by European institutions. Provided that 
innovative sectors face dynamic demands from international markets, 
sectoral policies may help the eurozone’s periphery to improve its 
external balance position, and possibly achieve high and sustainable 
growth rates. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a picture of 
structural asymmetries among eurozone countries. We assess them by 
computing a synthetic Productive Structure Similarity Index (PSSI) 
through which peripheral countries’ productive structures are compared 
with the German one. Furthermore, we assess central-periphery 
dichotomies as to the degree of (sector) diversification of their productive 
and export patterns. Section 3 analyses the implications of the above 
asymmetries in terms of diverging centre-periphery development paths. 
Here, attention is on the cumulative nature of production development as 
a technology and innovation process, hence the possible lock-in of 
peripheral euro countries in a low-growth low-tech trap. Section 4 
discusses how euro-level R&D/industrial policy could address such 
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dichotomies and provide a way out of the crisis by favouring the 
upgrading of peripheral countries’ production patterns. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Centre-periphery structural asymmetries in the eurozone 
 
When finance-led economic booms take place in developing 
countries, asymmetric productive structures with respect to more 
developed economies likely give rise to increasing external imbalances. 
Obviously, capital inflows can easily fill the gap in times of financial 
euphoria, when financial markets do not care about macroeconomic 
fundamentals and long-run trends (Krugman, 2009). However, abrupt 
shocks like the 2007-2008 worldwide financial meltdown very often 
induce sudden changes in the sentiments of foreign investors, huge 
capital flights and painful economic corrections in the host economies. 
The most recent economic facts in peripheral eurozone countries 
broadly follow the above sequence of events, and the tough policy 
measures they are currently implementing basically aim to deal with the 
accumulated external debt position. On the one hand, austerity packages 
may work to reduce imports by cutting expenditures, depressing 
economic activity and (indirectly) bring about a real exchange rate 
devaluation.5 On the other hand, since the exchange rate policy is out of 
the control of national monetary authorities, internal devaluation carried 
out through sharp wage cuts attempts to spur exports, and possibly, 
recovery. While these measures desperately try to counteract diverging 
inflation and unit cost trends between peripheral and central economies6 
and restore the price competitiveness of peripheral goods, productive 
structure asymmetries (in the form of the specific types of goods 
produced and sold) may easily frustrate such efforts. Ultimately, contrary 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5 See Gibson and van Seventer (2000) for an illustration of the mechanisms through which 
reductions in public expenditure induce a real exchange rate devaluation in a simplified 
open-economy neoclassical model. 
6 See Dullien and Fritsche (2009) and Bibow (2012) on diverging unit cost dynamics 
among eurozone countries. 
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to what is supposed by most international organisations, whereas the 
export response to internal devaluation may be mild, huge wage cuts may 
throw the economy into a deep recession and further impinge fiscal 
solidity.7 
What is the extent of the productive asymmetries among eurozone 
countries, in particular between central and peripheral economies? 
Simonazzi et al. (2013) have recently provided some evidence on 
structural differences between Germany and peripheral countries such as 
Spain, Greece and Portugal. They do so by analysing cross-country 
differences in manufactured goods’ exports, as synthesised by the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient calculated on the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) Balassa Index (BI). A more general 
perspective on all 28 European Union member states is provided by the 
European Commission (2013) by assessing and confronting the degree of 
sectoral productive specialisation characterising EU countries. In this 
paper we follow a similar logic and we first focus on differences in the 
industry composition of the domestic manufacturing sector. In more 
detail, we present a Productive Structure Similarity Index (PSSI), which 
is computed according to the following formula: 
 
Industry-level PSS index:                                 鶏鯨鯨荊珍痛沈 噺 嵳暢乳禰日 貸暢奈禰日 嵳岫暢乳禰日 袋暢奈禰日 岻  
 
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
7 Following the one-sector open economy model proposed by Taylor (1991), chapter 7, 
we know that: 穴憲/穴拳 = &(項〉/項拳)/(項〉/項憲), with 〉 being the usual open-economy 
equilibrium condition, u = (X/K) current capacity utilisation and w the monetary wage 
rate. Once (項〉/項憲) is assumed to be negative according to standard stability conditions, 
the above differential has a negative sign (i.e. wage cuts stimulate economic activity) if 
(項〉/項拳) is negative. A necessary condition for this event to occur is: 考/欠 & 1 & 講 (1 & 嫌¬)隙/継 > 0 (with さ being exports elasticity to the real exchange rate, a domestic 
dependence on imported intermediate goods, ヾ the profit share, sw saving propensity out 
of wages, X and E domestic production and exports, respectively). It is very likely that 
some peripheral eurozone countries like Greece and Portugal will not meet the above 
conditions, due to their relatively low propensity to export and heavy reliance on domestic 
demand injections. As to the consequences of austerity policies on fiscal solidity, note that 
public debt-to-GDP ratios have continuously increased in peripheral countries. In 2012, a 
partial default has been arranged in Greece. 
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Aggregated manufacturing sector PSS index: 鶏鯨鯨荊珍痛 噺 デ 釆 岫暢乳禰日 袋暢奈禰日 岻デ岫暢乳禰日 袋暢奈禰日 岻鶏鯨鯨荊珍痛沈 挽沈退津沈退怠   
where Mjt
i is the share of sector i of total manufacturing value added in 
country j at time t, and MGt
i represents the same figure in the case of 
Germany.8 The PSS index ranges from 0 (identical productive structures) 
to 1 (absolute divergence in the sectoral composition of the economy). 
We computed the PSSI for thirteen manufacturing sub-sectors and for the 
manufacturing sector as a whole, from 1999 to 2011. We take into 
account all the peripheral eurozone countries (the so-called PIIGS). We 
include in our analysis the Czech Republic and Poland as well. At the 
present time, these countries do not participate in the monetary union. 
Yet, according to Simonazzi et al. (2013), their productive structures 
have been significantly influenced by increasing productive connections 
with Germany. It might thus be interesting to compare the evolution of 
their productive structures with those that characterise peripheral 
eurozone countries in order to check for the emergence of two different 
(and diverging) production poles inside Europe. In the case of Spain, 
Ireland and Greece we also computed a PSSI index for the construction 
sector, in order to emphasise the housing bubble (and the consequences 
for productive structures) affecting those countries before the 2007-2008 
crisis, as well as the abrupt collapse (at least compared to other 
economies) of this same sector in the post-crisis period. Results for the 
overall manufacturing sector are reported in table 1 below. 
Results reported in table 1 show that small peripheral eurozone 
countries such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland present largely different 
productive structures with respect to the German one. Furthermore, 
productive asymmetries versus Germany seem to have widened and 
increased in the aftermath of the financial meltdown and throughout the 
ongoing eurozone crisis. 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
8 We built the PSS index in the same way as the well-known intra-industry trade Grubel-
Lloyd index. Of course, arguments in the PSS index are industry shares of total 
manufacturing value added in the economy under consideration and in the benchmark 
economy (i.e. Germany), instead of export and import flows among trading partners. 
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More disaggregated data9 tell us that most of these asymmetries 
come from the relative (and increasing) state of backwardness among the 
above peripheral countries in the production of capital goods, which, on 
the contrary, stands out as the core of German productive specialisation. 
This evidence may be a sign that productive development is not fully 
complete in the aforementioned peripheral economies, since the 
emergence of a considerable capital goods sector has traditionally been 
seen as the most advanced stage in the development process of an 
economy (Akamatsu, 1962; Ricottilli, 1993; Kojima, 2000). Furthermore, 
provided that a productive structure featuring a relatively developed 
capital goods sector is an important factor conducive to innovation and 
growth (Ricottilli, 1993), perverse structural changes linked to the 
ongoing crisis may have a long-lasting negative impact on the growth 
potential of small peripheral economies. 
Productive asymmetries with respect to Germany are much less 
evident in the case of larger economies such as Italy and Spain. However, 
centre-(big) peripheral countries’ asymmetries are slightly increasing 
across time, this evidence being different from the conclusions reached 
by Simonazzi et al. (2013) in the case of Italy. In 2010 and 2011 in 
particular, the persistent recession affecting peripheral economies seems 
to have impeded the recovery of the investment goods sector, while 
Germany recorded a significant upturn in its most typical industries.10 
Once again, should demand side-supply side interactions in the capital 
goods sector be relevant sources of technological spillovers for the whole 
economic system, such a temporary shock may impinge long-run 
performances also in the case of larger peripheral countries. 
As expected, Austria and the Czech Republic show a productive 
structure closely similar to that of Germany. In the case of the Czech 
Republic, according to Simonazzi et al. (2013), this may be  the result of  
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
9 More disaggregated data are available from the authors on request. 
10 According to data from Eurostat, in 2012 gross fixed capital formation (read investment 
demand) in Germany was higher than its 2005 pre-crisis level. By contrast, in Greece and 
Ireland investment demand was broadly half than that recorded in 2005. From 2005 to 
2012, it decreased by one-third in Portugal. In the case of Italy and Spain, drops in 
investment demand amounted to 20 and 28 percentage points, respectively. 
""
Table 1 – Productive Structure Similarity Index (PSSI) between selected European countries and Germany 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Austria 
  PSSI 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.17 
Czech Republic 
  PSSI 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 
France 
  PSSI 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.20 
Greece 
  PSSI (M) 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.45 
  PSSI (C) 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.37 0.31 0.24 0.07 0.13 0.30 
Ireland 
  PSSI (M) 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.52 0.53 
  PSSI (C) 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.36 0.43 0.46 0.40 0.26 0.21 0.41 0.46 
Italy 
  PSSI 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.22 
Poland 
  PSSI 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.29 n.a. 
Portugal 
  PSSI 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.35 n.a. 
Spain 
  PSSI (M) n.a. 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.24 
  PSSI (C) n.a. 0.32 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.42 0.37 
Note: letters (M) and (C) in parentheses stand for ‘manufacturing sector’ and ‘construction sector’ respectively. 
Source: author’s calculation on the basis of data from Eurostat. 
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the reorganisation of German industries through partial delocalisation in 
Eastern European countries. In the same vein, Poland presents a 
productive structure more similar to the German one than Portugal and 
Greece do, even though in 2008 the level of economic development in 
Poland (as expressed by GDP per-capita) was less than one-half of that in 
Greece, and barely 60 percent of Portuguese GDP per-capita.11 
Finally, note the astonishing housing-boom-led expansion of the 
construction sector in Greece, Ireland and Spain. In all these economies, 
the PSSI index indicated remarkably increases in the economic relevance 
of the construction industry in the years preceding the outbreak of the 
worldwide financial crisis, this fact being a clear sign of the abnormal 
dimension (at least with respect to Germany) assumed by such a 
productive sector in the peripheral countries under observation. The huge 
drop in this same index since 2007 onwards, and its subsequent increase 
in Ireland and Greece, now stand for construction sectors further 
contracting and now downsized with respect to what is observed in 
Germany, and, more in general, in other European Countries.   
In table 2, we extend our analysis and compute the above 
aggregated similarity index by now taking into account the sectoral 
composition of country exports. Sector definition follows the 
‘technological classification’ provided by UNCTAD, according to which 
export flows are subdivided into four different groups on the basis of 
their input and technological intensity: resource-based and labour-
intensive sectors; low-skill and low technology-intensive sectors; 
medium-skill and technology-intensive production; high-skill and 
technology-intensive industries. Arguments in the now-redefined Export 
Structure Similarity Index (ESS) are sectors’ export shares on total 
country exports. 
Computation of the ESS index confirms that productive structure 
asymmetries between Germany and small peripheral countries such as 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland are mirrored in relatively deep export 
structure differences. ESS index values associated to the above 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
11 According to traditional trade theory, trade and productive structures might be expected 
to become more similar the closer the development level of the economies under 
observation is. The above results may thus be considered partially surprising. 
 Structural asymmetries at the roots of the eurozone crisis 179 
economies are the highest among those reported in table 2. By contrast, 
export structure differences are much lower or rapidly decreasing in the 
case of Austria, the Czech Republic and Poland. Once again, high or 
quickly increasing export similarity between Germany, the Czech 
Republic and Poland is likely due to German companies’ outsourcing to 
the above-East-European countries, and of the ensuing increase in intra-
industry trade. Table 2 confirms the existence and further development of 
a well-connected cross-border productive block in the core centre of 
Europe among Germany and Eastern European countries. 
Data reported in table 2 also show that export structure differences 
between Germany and peripheral economies seem to be much lower 
when larger countries such as Italy and, in particular, Spain are 
considered. On the one hand, this result might be expected and could be 
due to the fact that larger peripheral countries likely produce and export a 
wider range of products than small economies do. On the other hand, this 
also depends on the high level of aggregation of trade records from which 
ESS indexes are calculated. Indeed, a closer look and a more 
disaggregated analysis of available trade statistics restores a sense of 
remarkable centre-periphery asymmetries, even when large peripheral 
economies are taken into account. 
Table 3 reports data on RCA Balassa indexes associated with the 
above-defined sectors. As expected, Germany shows a persistent 
comparative advantage in medium-tech sectors including most capital 
goods industries. From 1999 to 2012, German exports seem to 
concentrate even further in the medium/high-tech segment of 
manufacturing goods, while a process of increasing de-specialisation is 
taking place in labour and resource-intensive or low-tech sectors. Quite 
interestingly, the same processes can be detected in countries such as 
Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Italy and Spain are somehow midway on a hypothetical technology 
ladder from the eurozone periphery to Germany. In the case of Italy, its 
strong and persistent export specialisation in labour-intensive and low-
tech sectors is evident. Italy also maintains a relatively weak 
specialisation  in mechanical   industry  (a  traditional  pillar   of  Italian 
 
""
 
 
Table 2 – Export Structure Similarity Index (ESSI) between selected Eurozone countries and Germany 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 
Czech Republic 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 
France 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.17 
Greece 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 
Ireland 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.65 
Italy 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 
Poland 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 
Portugal 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Spain 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 
 
        Source: author’s calculation on the basis of data from UNCTAD. 
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exports). However, (revealed) comparative disadvantages are deep in the 
high-tech sector. As far as Spain is concerned, relative specialisation in 
the low-skill intensive sector is accompanied by comparative 
advantages in medium-skill technology-intensive industries. This last 
fact is obviously a common aspect with respect to the German 
experience, and consistent with low ESSI index values shown in table 
2. Nevertheless, whilst Spain’s relative specialisation in medium-skill 
sectors is mostly due to strong export concentration in a restricted 
bunch of industries, motor vehicles and railway vehicles mainly 
(sector codes 781, 782, 784 and 791 in the three-digit SITC rev. 3 
classification), German specialisation is the outcome of a much more 
diversified export structure, and comparative advantages were 
recorded in almost all capital goods sectors included in the medium-
tech category (more on this point in the following section). Indeed, 
when a covariance index is computed to evaluate the similarity of 
Spain vs. Germany in the sectoral distribution of comparative 
advantages in 2012, a negative value equal to -0.06 is obtained.12 With 
the exception of a few sectors, Germany presents comparative 
advantages in those industries where Spain does not. 
Small peripheral countries such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal are 
characterised by a radically different picture. Their export de-
specialisation in the medium-tech capital goods sector is evident and 
striking in the case of Ireland and Greece. In Greece and Portugal, 
comparative advantages are still significantly localised in labour and 
resource-intensive and low-tech sectors. In Greece and Ireland, finally, an 
RCA Balassa index higher than 1 is recorded in the case of high-tech 
industries. This perhaps surprising result largely depends on the type of 
manufacturing production included in such a group. According to 
UNCTAD classification, most chemical industries are classified as high- 
tech production. It  is in  these  sectors  that Greece  and Ireland score an 
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
12 Spanish-German covariance in sectoral specialisation is calculated according to the 
following index: 系頚撃稽荊弔【帳聴 噺 岫怠津岻 デ盤稽荊沈弔 伐 な匪岫稽荊沈帳聴 伐 な岻, with 稽荊沈弔  and 稽荊沈帳聴 being 
German and Spanish Balassa indexes in sector i in 2012, respectively. 
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Table 3 – RCA Balassa Index in selected European countries and in 
selected manufacturing sub-groups 
 
1999 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Austria 
Labour-intensive and resource-
intensive 1.04 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.95 
Low-skill and technology-
intensive 1.66 1.51 1.45 1.48 1.49 1.67 1.61 1.62 1.64 
Medium-skill and technology-
intensive 1.07 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.11 
High-skill and technology-
intensive 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.68 
Czech Republic 
Labour-intensive and resource-
intensive 1.06 0.85 0.80 0.79 0.76 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.68 
Low-skill and technology-
intensive 1.78 1.51 1.41 1.35 1.32 1.35 1.29 1.33 1.35 
Medium-skill and technology-
intensive 1.13 1.36 1.39 1.40 1.43 1.55 1.54 1.52 1.49 
High-skill and technology-
intensive 0.50 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.42 
France 
Labour-intensive and resource-
intensive 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.64 0.67 
Low-skill and technology-
intensive 1.06 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.86 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.82 
Medium-skill and technology-
intensive 1.01 1.04 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.94 0.90 
High-skill and technology-
intensive 1.30 1.31 1.34 1.33 1.35 1.34 1.42 1.42 1.42 
 Germany  
Labour-intensive and resource-
intensive 0.57 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.51 
Low-skill and technology-
intensive 1.01 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.93 0.90 0.86 0.88 
Medium-skill and technology-
intensive 1.23 1.32 1.29 1.29 1.31 1.33 1.35 1.35 1.32 
High-skill and technology-
intensive 1.09 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.97 1.01 
 Greece 
Labour-intensive and resource-
intensive 2.57 1.80 1.70 1.62 1.56 1.46 1.46 1.35 1.53 
Low-skill and technology-
intensive 1.18 1.43 1.34 1.34 1.56 1.54 1.42 1.85 1.69 
Medium-skill and technology-
intensive 0.33 0.42 0.49 0.55 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.45 
High-skill and technology-
intensive 0.82 1.22 1.21 1.20 1.18 1.24 1.26 1.19 1.22 
(continues) 
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(continued) 
Ireland 
Labour-intensive and resource-
intensive 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.11 
Low-skill and technology-
intensive 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 
Medium-skill and technology-
intensive 0.27 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 
High-skill and technology-
intensive 2.92 3.19 3.14 3.18 3.13 2.91 2.95 2.98 2.97 
Italy 
Labour-intensive and resource-
intensive 1.49 1.40 1.39 1.36 1.35 1.29 1.31 1.32 1.39 
Low-skill and technology-
intensive 1.21 1.27 1.27 1.31 1.25 1.40 1.32 1.30 1.30 
Medium-skill and technology-
intensive 0.92 0.99 1.01 1.03 1.07 1.11 1.07 1.06 1.01 
High-skill and technology-
intensive 0.65 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.70 
Poland 
Labour-intensive and resource-
intensive 1.84 1.34 1.27 1.27 1.22 1.21 1.25 1.24 1.26 
Low-skill and technology-
intensive 2.22 1.70 1.56 1.56 1.48 1.56 1.42 1.55 1.59 
Medium-skill and technology-
intensive 0.73 1.11 1.15 1.15 1.19 1.29 1.23 1.17 1.12 
High-skill and technology-
intensive 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.52 0.53 0.57 
Portugal 
Labour-intensive and resource-
intensive 2.42 2.22 2.17 2.25 2.21 2.18 2.18 2.19 2.12 
Low-skill and technology-
intensive 0.67 0.88 0.95 0.98 0.95 1.04 0.97 0.95 1.10 
Medium-skill and technology-
intensive 0.83 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.92 
High-skill and technology-
intensive 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.54 
Spain 
Labour-intensive and resource-
intensive 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.99 
Low-skill and technology-
intensive 1.22 1.26 1.26 1.15 1.11 1.20 1.21 1.20 1.19 
Medium-skill and technology-
intensive 1.23 1.20 1.20 1.21 1.21 1.26 1.19 1.21 1.14 
High-skill and technology-
intensive 0.69 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.86 0.82 0.87 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from UNCTAD. 
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increasing export specialisation.13 Germany, on the contrary, is acquiring 
an increasing specialisation in the production of high-tech transport 
equipment and scientific instruments (sector codes 791 and 87 in the 
SITC rev. 3 classification). Also in this case, centre-periphery differences 
that may appear somehow softened at an aggregate level of analysis 
clearly re-emerge when a more disaggregated perspective is adopted. 
 
2.1. Specialisation versus diversification in the eurozone 
 
Some economists might reply to this analysis by arguing that 
productive and export differences among countries might not necessarily 
imply negative consequences for the long-run growth potential of an 
economy. According to them, trade and monetary integration might 
actually accelerate economic growth thanks to dynamic economies of 
scale originating from production and trade specialisation (Rivera-Batiz 
and Romer, 1991; Backus et al., 1992; Lee, 1995; Lane, 1996). While 
this argument usually refers to economic integration among similar 
developed countries (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991), two possible 
answers could be levied against such an objection. First, a traditional 
response would stress that growth performance depends on the specific 
sector you specialise in. Growth potential in the periphery may thus 
worsen (at least with respect to the centre) should it perversely specialise 
in passive sectors experiencing poor technological improvements. 
Second, according to some recent evidence, economic growth and a 
relevant part of the development process are significantly characterised 
by a process of productive and export diversification, instead of 
concentration and specialisation (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003; Klinger and 
Lederman, 2004; Rodrik, 2007). It is the enlargement of the production 
(export) space of a given economy that allows for growth acceleration 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
13 Greece is specialised in the production of fertilisers, perfumes and plastic goods (sector 
codes 55, 56 and 57 in the SITC rev. 3 classification). In the case of Ireland, specialisation 
is strongly concentrated in the production of perfumes and pharmaceutical goods (sector 
codes 541, 542 and 551 in the SITC rev. 3 classification at three-digit disaggregation 
level). 
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and catching-up with more advanced countries (Herzer and Nowak-
Lehmann, 2006; Rodrik, 2007).14 
In light of this evidence, here we re-elaborate the analysis carried out in 
the previous section in order to stress differences between central and 
peripheral countries as to the diversification of their productive and export 
bases. Indeed, when we emphasise the need for a process of structural 
convergence between central and peripheral economies, we do not mean that 
all of them should adopt exactly the same productive structure and export the 
same types of goods. Yet, we stress that peripheral eurozone countries, in 
particular some small peripheral economies, should undertake a significant 
process of innovation-led diversification of their production sectors towards 
high-tech dynamic sectors in order to partially close the structural gap with 
respect to more advanced central economies. 
There is an intrinsic contradiction between revealed comparative 
advantages, as measured by the Balassa index, and the degree of 
diversification in an economy’s production and export base. The more 
heterogeneous the range of goods you produce and export on 
international markets, the lower the sectoral Balassa indexes will be.15 In 
order to deal with these technical aspects, in table 4 we present a series of 
indicators which, taken together, may perhaps provide a comprehensive 
perspective on the structural features of selected European countries. 
Data reported in table 4 rely on a detailed three-digit decomposition of 
European countries’ exports. In column one we compute the number of 
industrial sectors showing values of Balassa index higher than 0.9 (i.e. 
those sectors that present or are close to presenting a comparative 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14 The specialisation/diversification divide may be at least partially reconcile if you think 
that specialisation in the industrial sector away from natural-resource based industries (i.e. 
a main feature of the development process) generally entails the expansion of the range of 
home-made manufactured goods. In a way, product diversification may lie behind 
specialisation in manufacturing or traded-good sectors that characterise fast-growing 
economies in two-sector models by Krugman (1981) and Matsuyama (1992) among 
others. 
15 Indeed, this is why average Balassa indexes are generally higher in relatively backward 
countries with export structures concentrated in a restrict bunch of sectors than in more 
diversified advanced economies. 
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advantage).16 Column two reports the median value of the sectoral 
Balassa indexes. We put emphasis on a median Balassa index instead of 
an average one because the former is more robust than the latter. In 
addition, average values of sectoral Balassa indexes are influenced by in-
built asymmetries characterising the computation of such an indicator: an 
average sectoral Balassa index, taken alone, might provide a distorted 
image of a country’s external competitiveness.17 Finally, in the third 
column of table 4, we report the inverse of sectoral Balassa indexes’ 
variance. We label such an indicator as the concentration index, since it 
might provide information about the degree of homogeneity of a 
country’s export structure. Values in parentheses in column three are 
average values of the sectoral Balassa indexes. Figure 1 graphically 
reproduces data reported in table 4. In figure 1, the dimensions of each 
bubble stand for the abovementioned concentration index. The larger (the 
lower) a bubble dimension is, the higher is a country sectors’ comparative 
advantage concentration (dispersion) around its mean value. 
According to table 4, in Germany 106 out of 166 industrial sectors 
included in the SITC rev. 3 classification (at three digit disaggregation 
level) score Balassa indexes higher than 0.9 in 2012. This figure is the 
highest registered amongst the European countries under observation, and 
far higher than the same statistics recorded in most peripheral countries 
with the partial exception of Italy. Consistent with the above results, the 
median Balassa index in Germany is rather high and equal to 1.01. It is 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
16 Statistics reported in column 1 of table 3 are computed according to a Balassa index 
threshold level lower than 1 (i.e. the traditional boundary between revealed comparative 
advantage and disadvantage), and equal to 0.9. We do so in light of the above 
consideration of the inverse relationship connecting revealed comparative advantages and 
the diversification of an economy export structure. The lower-than-usual threshold we 
adopt allows us to take into account in our statistics also those industries that register 
Balassa indexes slightly lower than 1 but that might wrongly be considered as 
uncompetitive. Their apparent lack of competitiveness may actually derive from a 
widening of the home economy export base rather than from a country’s exclusion from 
international markets. 
17 By construction, the Balassa index ranges between zero and, potentially, infinity. 
Accordingly, the arithmetic average of sectoral Balassa indexes will naturally increase in 
the case of highly concentrated productive structures. Median values of the above index, 
on the contrary, better reflect the degree of sectoral polarisation of a country’s productive 
and export vector. 
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much higher than those characterising peripheral countries (with, again, the 
exception of Italy). In the case of Portugal, Greece and, in particular, 
Ireland, median Balassa indexes are considerably lower than 1. This means 
that these countries feature highly concentrated export structures: the vast 
majority of industrial sectors show revealed disadvantages, whilst 
comparative advantages emerge only in a few of them. Such a perspective 
is corroborated by both the considerable gap that divides median from 
average Balassa indexes in the above economies (the latter being 
considerably higher than the former), and by the high dispersion of sectoral 
comparative advantages (indexes) around corresponding mean values (see 
the smaller bubbles associated with small peripheral economies in figure 
1). The median and average Balassa indexes are almost equal in Germany. 
Further, from figure 1 it becomes astonishingly clear that a high level of 
concentration of sectors’ Balassa indexes are clustered around the 
corresponding mean value in Germany (dashed vertical line in figure 1). 
Needless to say, this is a sign that, on top of increasing price 
competitiveness, Germany’s enthusiastic export performances significantly 
depend on structural causes, i.e. the diversification of Germany’s 
productive structure and the capability to export a wide range of goods. 
 
Table 4 – Export (productive) structure differentiation in selected 
European countries 2012 
  
Industrial Sectors 
with RCA > 0.9 Median 
Concentration Index (Average 
Balassa Index) 
Austria  96 1.14 0.65 (1.34) 
Czech Republic 83 0.88 0.78 (1.22) 
France  78 0.86 1.61 (1.03) 
Germany  106 1.01 5.53 (1.06) 
Greece  53 0.47 0.14 (1.07) 
Ireland  19 0.16 0.11 (0.79) 
Italy  99 1.12 0.41 (1.32) 
Poland  77 0.84 0.53 (1.25) 
Portugal  68 0.69 0.01 (2.09) 
Spain  78 0.85 1.17 (1.07) 
Source: author’s calculations based on data from UNCTAD. 
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Figure 1 – Export (productive) structure differentiation in selected 
European countries 2012 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration based on data from UNCTAD. 
 
 
The empirical evidence presented so far, and the above economic 
implications, deserve three more comments.  
First, Ireland seems to represent an exception to the prototype 
development process described in the previous sections, and a peculiar 
case with respect to other central and peripheral euro countries. Indeed, 
impressive GDP per-capita growth rates registered in Ireland in the 
second half of the 1990s and before the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis largely hinged on the expansion of a few dynamic high-tech 
sectors. Accordingly, Ireland’s successful catching-up to more developed 
economies mostly relied upon increasing productive and export 
polarisation rather than diversification, suggesting that diversification 
might not be a necessary condition for growth acceleration and solid 
external balance-of-payments positions to emerge. Although we cannot 
neglect the positive outcomes of such an alternative development pattern, 
exclusive reliance on it should be undertaken with caution. First, 
specialisation-based growth may be viable and sustainable in the case of 
small economies (like Ireland), but perhaps less suitable in the case of 
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larger countries. Second, the Irish development experience has some 
shadowy areas beside the highlights. Indeed, Irish high-tech exports are 
mostly due to foreign multinationals delocalising a small (and decreasing) 
part of much wider (and internationally fragmented) production processes 
in Ireland. According to recent analyses by the European Commission on 
global value chains (2013), the effective domestic content of Irish 
manufacturing exports is lower than 50 percent, this figure being 
significantly lower than those observed in other eurozone and Eastern 
European countries. Furthermore, domestic services, in particular 
knowledge-intensive business services, account for a marginal part of 
Irish manufactured exports’ value added.18 All in all, the Irish export 
sector seems to be a sort of enclave with poor backward and forward 
linkages with the rest of the economic system.19 These facts cast doubts 
on the concrete capability of the Irish export sector to feed fast export-led 
recovery and, above all, job creation.20 Macroeconomic data reported in 
the appendix to this paper demonstrates that during the 2000s and before 
the outbreak of the world crisis, persistent Irish trade balance surpluses 
had become insufficient to compensate for huge profit repatriation out of 
Ireland, and insufficient to avoid an overall negative current account 
position from emerging. It is reasonable to believe that safe current 
account surplus positions might be obtained in the future only by 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
18 Some recent empirical analyses stress the positive effects knowledge-intensive business 
(KIB) service inputs can induce on manufacturing innovativeness (Ciriaci et al., 2013). In 
light of this evidence, scarce production linkages between export sectors and domestic 
KIB services in Ireland could represent a shortcoming of the Irish development pattern 
raising constraints to its innovation capabilities and perhaps to its long-run sustainability. 
19 According to Foster et al. (2013), possible negative effects of poor backward and 
forward linkages on domestic development might be compensated for by efficiency gains 
and higher external competitiveness of home-made production as accruing from 
participating at internationally fragmented value chains.  
20 See Kinsella (2012; 2014) on the pros and cons of the peculiar Irish development 
model, and on the effectiveness of austerity packages when applied to the specific Irish 
context. Note, in particular, Kinsella’s concern about unemployment rates higher than 
those expected according to EU/IMF forecasts, and recent unemployment reductions 
mostly due to emigration (Kinsella, 2014). Note, also, that a brief inspection of the IMF’s 
most recent projections on Irish growth would reveal significant downsizing with respect 
to past post-bailout forecasts in the order of 1 percentage point (see IMF World Economic 
Outlook, April 2014).      
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increasing the degree of integration of the Irish export sector with the rest 
of the economy, and by widening the set of exported goods. This might 
be the main goal of future industrial policies targeted on the specific 
needs of eurozone peripheral countries, Ireland among others (more on 
this in section 4 of the paper). 
Second, large peripheral economies such as Spain and Italy appear 
much closer to Germany in terms of productive and export diversification 
than small peripheral countries do. In Italy, in particular, the majority of 
manufacturing sectors present Balassa indexes higher than 0.9 (99 sectors 
out of 166). This is likely due to the long-lasting Italian tradition in the 
production of some manufactured goods. This fact notwithstanding, the 
Italian economy seems to be stuck in a sort of structural hysteresis. In line 
with data contained in table 3, Italian manufacturing strength remains 
concentrated in labour and low-skill intensive sectors, while more 
technologically advanced sectors are largely absent from the Italian 
production landscape. This fact is reflected in the high level of 
polarisation (i.e. a low concentration index) of comparative advantages 
that characterises the Italian economy. 
Productive and export diversification have been relatively intensive 
in the Czech Republic and Poland. These countries are now better ranked 
than small peripheral eurozone countries in terms of the widening of their 
production space. Such structural changes may have favoured the partial 
convergence in GDP per-capita that has recently emerged between these 
countries and peripheral eurozone economies like Portugal and Greece 
(see figure A.1). However, their long lasting effects on Poland and the 
Czech Republic’s growth potential are still to be verified. These effects 
will largely depend on the deepness of the aforementioned structural 
changes. Indeed, the Czech Republic experience seems to present 
similarities with the Irish development pattern, since the emergence of 
new sectors seems to reflect delocalisation in the home economy of 
relatively small segments of much more complex production processes. 
Accordingly, these sectors are weakly embedded in the host economy, 
and give rise to a scarce demand for manufacturing and service-sector 
inputs. This same evidence is much less strong in the case of Poland, 
where domestic production connections appear more solid (see European 
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Commission, 2013). Once again, it could be expected that pro-growth 
effects of ongoing structural change will differ from one economy to 
another according to the capability of new industries to demand domestic 
intermediate inputs, and give rise to a ‘fat’ input-output matrix.    
 
 
3. Productive asymmetries and innovation dynamics in the eurozone 
 
A considerable body of literature has traditionally placed great 
emphasis on the problems arising from economic (and monetary) 
integration between asymmetric economies. Balance of payments 
constrained models, for instance, have clearly shown that productivity 
backwardness in the periphery can induce peripheral countries to 
persistently fall behind more developed economies (see McCombie and 
Thirlwall, 1994; Thirlwall, 2011). The economic scenario now prevailing 
in the periphery of the eurozone is no exception, and there exists 
mounting concern about hysteretic effects of the ongoing crisis on long-
run growth and employment dynamics in peripheral countries (Fitoussi 
and Saraceno, 2013). 
In the past, the strategic answer of most less developed countries to 
recurrent (external) imbalances and economic downswings was the 
intervention of the public sector in the economic sphere so as to support 
domestic industrialisation and eliminate structural asymmetries with 
respect to more developed economies. Since the beginning of the 1980s, 
however, the ruling policy regime has changed conformingly to the newly 
set neoliberal agenda. Sectoral industrial policies have been abandoned, 
and protectionist measures removed. Market liberalisation has been 
implemented in order to increase competitive pressures. Industrial policy 
has mostly taken the form of horizontal measures. According to this 
view, innovation should have emerged from market-driven business 
initiatives rather than public sector-targeted actions. Sectoral allocation of 
productive inputs should have been driven by unfettered market 
mechanisms, while industrial policy should have attended to increasing 
the availability of productive inputs only. From the neoliberal 
192  PSL Quarterly Review 
perspective, long-run economic growth is purely a supply-side 
phenomenon. 
The current institutional design of the eurozone is largely inspired by 
such a philosophy. So far, European industrial policy has largely 
amounted to a considerable body of rules aiming to eliminate market 
barriers, limit national governments’ actions that may distort market 
mechanisms and enforce a business-driven approach to innovation. 
According to Pelkmans (2006), the European “economic union [mostly] 
consists of the internal market and a very modest set of cohesion [read 
regional] policies” (Pelkmans, 2006, p. 5). Protracted crisis in the 
periphery of the eurozone and persistent centre-periphery asymmetries 
now cast doubts on the effectiveness of such an institutional structure 
(Pianta and Lucchese, 2012). Pressures to rediscover and reconsider 
sectoral, and perhaps market-distorting, industrial policies are increasing 
(Aghion et al., 2011). Indeed, some of these observations have gained 
some attention from EU institutions as witnessed by the most recent 
European Commission communications (European Commission, 2012; 
2014) on the state of European industry. Yet, there are at least two well-
grounded reasons to believe that such changes, although relevant, are not 
enough to effectively confront the deep and widening centre-periphery 
industrial-technology gaps. One argument comes from the economic 
theory on structural change and innovation. The other one is based on the 
observation of some stylised facts within the eurozone. 
From a theoretical point of view, the process of structural change 
and production upgrading implies innovation. Indeed, structural change 
basically means that new sectors must emerge and new goods be 
produced through a more general Smithian process of increasing division 
of labour (Ricottilli, 1993). New and more efficient technologies must be 
adopted. The abundant evolutionary literature on innovation, in turn, 
underlines at least three main features of innovation processes. First, 
innovation requires the acquisition and development of scientific 
knowledge and of technological and managerial capabilities. The 
evolution of these competencies heavily relies on interactions between 
technologically intertwined firms and industries. In a way, firm and 
sectoral technological and productive dynamics can be thought of as 
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pieces of a more complex puzzle, in which they are strictly 
complementary to each other. In this context, the profitability of any 
single firm or industry is influenced by the (perhaps close) availability of 
other connected activities. Accordingly, market failures arising from a 
lack of coordination among interdependent productive initiatives can 
impede new production initiatives from being viable in relatively 
backward economies, and lead to cumulative divergence between 
developed and (relatively) underdeveloped economies (Ros, 2000; 
Lorentz and Llerena, 2004). Second, and consistently with the previous 
point, scientific and technological capabilities stand out as perhaps 
intangible inputs that are at least partially sticky and spatially localised 
(Cimoli et al., 2009). Indeed, innovation and technological knowledge 
have a cumulative and path-dependent nature in that their evolution 
hinges on past innovation and knowledge (Cimoli et al., 2009; 
Castellacci, 2007). Accordingly, it is pretty hard to believe that 
innovation capabilities and technological competencies could naturally 
flow from global technological frontiers to relatively backward 
economies only through market mechanisms. Last but not least, 
innovation processes involve a great deal of Knightian uncertainty, so 
that their positive outcome cannot be (probabilistically) assessed due to 
the lack of any reliable probability distribution function. It is even more so in 
the case of path-breaking innovations. This is why historical facts clearly 
show that most radical innovations (and the subsequent wave of creative 
destruction) are mostly due to public authorities’ efforts in envisioning new 
technological paradigms, and to strong public support and procurement of 
targeted innovations. Several private sector innovations have been triggered 
by technological breaches previously opened or pursued by ‘entrepreneurial 
states’ (see Mazzucato, 2011 on this point). 
All the above properties of innovation processes provide strong 
arguments for calling public intervention in the economic sphere back so 
as to stimulate structural change and economic development. Even more, 
paraphrasing Mazzucato (2011), state intervention may be expected not 
only to deal with market failures and to fix markets but also to actively 
create them. When related to the specific eurozone context, these 
observations imply that structural and technological convergence between 
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central and peripheral economies cannot be thought an automatic 
outcome of economic and monetary integration, and of unfettered market 
forces.  More reasonably, it might take place in the future only by 
adopting some ad-hoc preferential measures targeted on peripheral 
regions’ development needs (more on this in section 4). 
Besides the above theoretical arguments, available empirical 
evidence on innovation performances in the EU undoubtedly confirms the 
persistence of profound technological and innovation gaps among 
member States.21 Even worse, centre-periphery structural differences may 
even widen in the foreseeable future as long-run outcomes of the present 
crisis. The European Commission clearly states in the 2013 Innovation 
Union Scoreboard (IUS) that from 2008 to 2012, “the overall process of 
[innovation performance] convergence witnessed in previous IUS 
editions has come to a halt […] and has been reversed into divergence in 
2012” (European Commission, 2013, pp. 11-12). In the case of Greece, in 
particular, innovation performance has dramatically weakened since 2008 
on, scoring the worst negative percentage variation (-1.66% yearly) 
among European countries. The Innovation Union Scoreboard takes into 
account all 28 EU member states in evaluating converging and diverging 
patterns inside Europe. Nonetheless, a narrower focus on central and 
peripheral euro countries confirms the above findings. In table 5 below 
we first assess changes in the degree of dispersion of euro countries’ 
innovation performances through the well-known Theil index. We do so 
since decomposition techniques applied to the Theil index allow us to 
measure how much of converging/diverging trends in euro countries’ 
innovation performances might be imputed to ‘within-group’ and/or 
‘between-group’ differences. In table 5, we also check for the emergence 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
21 The European Commission evaluates European countries’ innovation performance by 
computing an eight-dimension index covering several aspects of the innovation process 
(i.e. public and private support to R&D activities, availability of high-skilled labour, firms 
interaction into production networks etc.). Results of this analysis are published as the 
Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS). According to the 2013 Innovation Union 
Scoreboard, peripheral countries are still classified as ‘moderate innovators’. On the 
contrary, Germany is classified as one of the most innovative worldwide economic 
systems together with Finland, Denmark and Sweden. Most of the other central developed 
economies are defined as ‘innovation followers’. Ireland is the only exception among 
peripheral countries, since it belongs to the ‘innovation followers’ group. 
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of beta convergence as reflected by the degree of correlation between 
countries’ innovation records at the beginning of a period and subsequent 
growth rates in innovation/technological deepening. Data on average 
annual growth rates are taken from Innovation Union Scoreboards 2008 
and 2013, and distinguished between two different periods: the pre-crisis 
years from 2004 to 2008, and from 2008 to 2012. 
According to table 5, mild signs of decreasing heterogeneity 
between central and peripheral euro countries were registered between 
2006 and 2008. Most of this trend, however, was due to higher ‘within-
group’ homogeneity, rather than lower technological differences between 
central and peripheral countries. Indeed, ‘between-group’ differences 
remain sustained and broadly unchanged all along the time span covered 
by our analysis. They still account, on average, for more than two-thirds 
of the observed dispersion. 
Data contained in the 2008 Innovation Union Scoreboard seem to show 
some sort of beta convergence between central and peripheral countries. 
This data, however, should be viewed with caution since subsequent 
revisions of European countries’ innovation performances generally 
tended to describe a wider central-periphery technological gap. 
Furthermore, the above tendency seems to be reversed since 2008 on, so 
that a deepening innovative gap now divides peripheral from central 
economies. This last result is highly influenced by the worrisome 
negative innovative performance characterising Greece during the last 
five years. Nonetheless, even when dropping Greece from our sample, 
centre-periphery technological convergence has stopped and substantially 
vanished since the outbreak of the present crisis. This picture could get 
even worse if we consider that some of the latest pieces of information 
contained in the most recent multi-dimensional innovation performance 
indexes refer to 2010. It is very likely that they do not reflect to a full 
extent the perverse effects of a protracted recession on the innovation 
parabola of peripheral economies. 
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Table 5 – Converging/diverging trends in innovation performances, 
central and peripheral eurozone countries 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Dispersion in innovation  
performances (Theil index) 0.034 0.033 0.028 0.030 0.026 0.029 0.031 
  Within-group difference 0.012 0.011 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.009 
  (percentage of total) (34) (33.3) (25.5) (28.9) (26.6) (34.7) (30.9) 
   Between-group difference 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.022 
  (percentage of total) (66) (66.7) (74.5) (71.1) (73.4) (65.3) (69.1) 
  2004-2008 2008-2012 
Beta convergence -0.54 0.33 
Beta convergence (excl. Greece) -0.004 
Source: author’s calculation on the basis of data from the Innovation Union Scoreboard, years 2008, 
2010, 2012 and 2013. 
Note: ‘central economies’: Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. ‘Peripheral economies’: 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Theil index values are computed on the base of data 
provided by Innovation Union Scoreboard 2010 and 2013. Beta convergence calculations rely on 
data from 2008 Innovation Union Scoreboard for the period from 2004 and 2008. Data contained in 
the 2013 Innovation Union Scoreboard are used for assessing beta convergence since 2008 on.   
 
A closer look at the single components of the aggregated innovation 
performance index computed by the European Commission reveals that 
centre-peripheral gaps are particularly relevant in three fields. First, 
peripheral economies (with the exception of Ireland) lag far behind 
central economies concerning the accumulation of human resources as 
measured by the percentage of new doctoral graduates per thousand 
inhabitants (aged 24-64), and by the percentage of people completing 
upper secondary and tertiary education. Second, private and public 
financing of research activities and innovation, and firms involvement in 
R&D expenditures are particularly disappointing in peripheral countries 
with respect to data registered in central economies. Finally, peripheral 
countries seem to be persistently afflicted by a low capability to create 
shared innovations through (productive) linkages inside their own 
national innovation systems. This final point is particularly worrisome if 
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we think that, according to Filippetti and Archibugi (2011), “countries 
endowed with stronger national innovation systems [read central 
economies] are less affected and are better able to respond, at least in 
relative terms, to the present recession” (Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011, 
p. 10). Figures 2 and 3 below provide further evidence on such peripheral 
countries’ (negative) gaps. Figure 2 portrays data on human resource 
employment in scientific and high-tech sectors as a percentage of total 
labour force in 2008 and 2012 in selected European countries. In our 
view, these data may be intended as giving insights on technology 
absorption and generation capabilities in the above economies as related 
to employment opportunities in high-tech activities. Figure 2 clearly 
shows that peripheral euro countries lag far behind central economies, 
and that the centre-periphery gap is widening since 2008 on. Upward 
trends in the scientific and high-tech sectors’ employment have been 
uniformly registered in central economies (above-bisectrix points in 
figure 2). On the contrary, these same figures (slightly) decline in most 
peripheral eurozone countries (below-bisectrix points in figure 2), all but 
Portugal and Ireland in the post-crisis period. In this regard, data on 
Portugal and Ireland must be handled with care. Actually, (relative) 
employment dynamics in Portugal and Ireland also reflect rather unique 
reductions in the available labour force that have not been registered 
elsewhere. Effective improvements in high-tech sector employment in 
Portugal and Ireland are indeed smaller than those emerging, at first sight, 
from figure 2. 
Figure 3 matches each other data on R&D expenditures by private 
firms and by public agents (governments and high-education institutions). 
According to figure 3, peripheral countries are clustered in the South-
West part of figure 3 with respect to the North-East position of central 
economies. In the periphery, a low propensity to invest in innovative 
activities by the private sector is further exacerbated by relatively low 
efforts by national governments and higher education systems. 
The empirical evidence portrayed through figures 2 and 3 is not 
surprising as far as the private sector’s innovative character is concerned. 
Indeed,  a considerable body of literature clearly stresses that productive 
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Figure 2 – Human resource (HR) employment in scientific and high-tech 
(HT) sectors, selected European countries, years 2008-2012 
 
 
Note: last data available on United Kingdom refer to 2011. Country sample in figure 2 also includes 
Denmark (DK), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK). 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from Eurostat. 
 
 
structure asymmetries are naturally reflected in differing cross-country 
intensities with which private agents perform innovative activities, devote 
resources to R&D and eventually create employment opportunities in the 
high tech sector (Bilbao-Osorio and Rodriguez-Pose, 2004; Filippetti and 
Archibugi, 2011). In light of this, public authorities in the periphery 
should devote special attention to innovation (both directly and indirectly 
by properly incentivising private sector-led innovation) in order to 
overcome technology lock-in phenomena. In the short run, public 
authorities may be expected to compensate private sector backwardness 
in  innovation  activities. In the  long  run  and  according  to  a  dynamic 
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Figure 3 – Public (Government plus high education sector) and private 
expenditures on R&D activities in percentage of GDP, 
 selected countries, years 2011 
 
 
 
Note: data on Greece (EL) refer to 2007. Data on the United States (US) refer to 2009. Country 
sample in figure 3 also includes Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), 
Sweden (SE), United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US).  
Source: author’s calculations based on data from Eurostat. 
 
perspective, public institutions should try to trigger off virtuous self-
reinforcing feedbacks between public-private innovation efforts. In this 
sense, Mazzucato (2011) is very clear when she notes that the emergence 
of innovative firms and new sectors very often represent long-run 
outcomes of an entrepreneurial state directly demanding and searching 
for technology leapfrogs. Data reported in figure 3 thus witness the co-
existence of virtuous/vicious public-private feedbacks in innovation 
activities at the centre and at the periphery of the eurozone, respectively. 
There is a concrete risk that innovation capabilities in the periphery of the 
eurozone will further fall behind those of central economies and those of 
‘technology frontier’ countries. 
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4. Regional policies for regional development: whatÕs new for 
European industrial policy? 
 
Theoretical reasons and empirical facts both suggest that existing 
centre-periphery structural asymmetries and diverging growth potentials 
will likely and naturally persist in the future in the absence of any specific 
economic strategy to tackle them. A deeply revised EU industrial policy 
is the first candidate to come in and deal with such a centre-periphery 
technology divide. Let’s see some principles that may inspire future EU 
industrial policy. 
According to the above evidence, future European industrial policy 
should have a strong regional character. With this term, we first mean 
that peripheral countries’ productive development should become the 
main goal of industrial measures undertaken by European institutions, 
and that industrial policy should emerge as the strongest action to favour 
regional cohesion and centre-periphery convergence. Cohesion funds, 
structural funds and financial resources devoted to R&D and innovation 
should become parts of a unique integrated policy focused on peripheral 
countries’ productive development.  
The regional ‘orientation’ of EU industrial policies also means that 
they should be calibrated to specific regional development problems. The 
periphery of the Eurozone does not represent a homogeneous body. 
Rather, it is composed of heterogeneous systems with different needs. 
Ireland, we noted, is relatively well placed as to productive specialisation 
in dynamic and fast-growing sectors on international markets (see a 
positive correlation value in table 6 below).22 Yet, its export sector is 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
22 In table 6, we assess the degree of correlation between peripheral countries’ sectoral 
revealed comparative advantages (RCA) and fast-growing manufacturing sectors (FGS) in 
international markets. Fast-growing sectors are defined as industries whose worldwide 
exports have growth, on average, faster than overall manufactured exports from 1995 to 
2012. Correlation indexes reported in table 6 are computed according to the following 
formula: 眺寵凋庁弔聴 系荊 噺 岫怠津岻デ 盤稽荊沈珍 伐 な匪 岾直日直葱 伐 な峇津沈退怠 . In the computation of a country 眺寵凋庁弔聴 系荊 index, 稽荊沈珍 stands for country j’s Balassa index (BI) in sector i in 2012; gi is the average 
worldwide export growth rate in sector i from 1995 to 2012 and gw is the average 
worldwide growth rate of overall manufactured goods from 1995 to 2012. Positive values 
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weakly linked with the rest of the economy. Industrial policy in Ireland 
should thus primarily focus on preserving existing Irish comparative 
advantages, whilst strengthening domestic productive networks, the 
export sector’s demand for domestic manufactured and service inputs and 
domestic participation in global value chains. 
 
 
Table 6 – Peripheral euro countries’ specialisation in demand dynamic 
sectors, correlation index 2012 
 
RCA-(average) sectoral demand growth rate correlation 
Greece -0.12 
Ireland   0.14 
Italy -0.28 
Portugal -0.76 
Spain -0.05 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from UNCTAD. 
 
 
Italy and Spain are much more diversified economies, but Italy in 
particular still presents strong comparative advantages in stagnant and 
mature industries. Here, industrial policies should target the creation of 
new high-tech firms and sectors in order to strategically modify existing 
comparative advantages towards high-tech sectors and away from more 
traditional low-tech industries. Last but not least, industrial policies 
should likely adopt a multi-task perspective in small countries such as 
Greece and Portugal, in which strong productive and export concentration 
(i.e. poor diversification) combines with the low-tech nature of prevailing 
industries. 
The regional focus of future EU industrial policies naturally raises 
questions as to the institutions that should finance and implement them. 
As to the financial side of the story, the sovereign debt crisis and the 
ensuing constraints (self-imposed by EU institutions or set by financial 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
indicate relative specialization in fast-growing sectors. Negative values witness a 
country’s RCA advantages registered in a relatively stagnant industry.   
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markets) to member states’ budgets impose strait jackets on national 
governments’ capabilities to finance vigorous industrial and innovation 
policies. Thus, European institutions should take a much more 
interventionist stance, and considerably expand financial resources 
devoted to an integrated cohesion-industrial-technology policy. This is 
even more the case if we think about EU institutions acting in the 
(hopefully not too distant) future as the ‘entrepreneurial state’ described 
by Mazzucato (2011). Obviously, this would entail providing EU 
institutions with more conspicuous financial resources than are currently 
made available. Eurobond issuances in a future European or at least in a 
eurozone federal entity might be the financial vehicle needed to pursue 
this task.23 Besides this, vital financial support to peripheral countries’ 
productive development may be provided by the European Investment 
Bank (EIB). From the very outset, the EIB was conceived as a public 
development bank providing funds mainly for infrastructural projects 
(Griffith-Jones and Tyson, 2013). More recently, it has started to focus on 
the development of technologically advanced small and medium sized 
firms, as well. This is good news. Indeed, the EIB’s traditional remit 
concerning infrastructure financing, although appreciable, cannot fully 
remove economic bottlenecks and coordination failures that prevent 
productive upgrading from taking place at the periphery of the eurozone. 
The EIB’s financial support of productive development should thus 
become a main pillar of its action. Furthermore, it should go beyond the 
provision of public guarantees to private agents’ financing of innovation 
efforts, and perhaps take a riskier direct financial stance with an anti-
cyclical character. The EIB’s financial load of supported projects should 
increase in times of financial and economic distress. Such a new 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
23 Unfortunately, following Fiorentini and Montani (2013), the European Council seems 
to have recently preferred taking a different path, downsizing the EU budget instead of 
expanding it. On 8th February 2013, the European Council decided to cut the EU budget 
to 1% of EU GDP. Furthermore, an eight percentage point cut in cohesion and regional 
funds has been proposed in the framework of the 2014-2020 multi-period budget. 
Ultimately, Horizon 2020, i.e. the European Commission 2014-2020 R&D program, 
establishes that European funds for R&D and innovation activities will amount to €80 
billion from 2014 to 2020, i.e. 0.08 percent of 2012 EU GDP yearly. It is very hard to see 
how these (to be fair) modest measures could effectively address inside-Europe 
discrepancies noted in the paper. 
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orientation would constitute a deep discontinuity with respect to the 
EIB’s current behaviour. Indeed, the co-financing philosophy that 
currently informs its operation intrinsically makes it pro-cyclical 
whenever austerity programs cut national funds for public investment and 
depress private agents’ propensity to take on risk.  
As to the institutional framework in which EU industrial policy 
should be implemented, national and sub-national authorities will likely 
play a decisive role in order to make its implementation efficient and 
effective. Designing EU industrial policies according to regional 
development needs requires recollecting information on local 
development bottlenecks and opportunities, calibrating policy measures 
in order to maximise local systems’ responsiveness, as well as screening 
and evaluating policy outcomes. National and regional authorities may 
likely perform these functions better than a centralised authority due to 
their proximity and supposedly better knowledge of regional socio-
economic contexts. These facts notwithstanding, we argue that national 
and sub-national authorities should be integrated into and cooperate with 
a wider EU-centred institutional body. We think about, let’s say, a 
European Industrial Development Authority interacting with economic 
agents and local institutions, and coordinating investment in order to 
foster innovation in the European Union as a whole, and in peripheral 
countries in particular. Historical experience of the Japanese Ministry for 
Trade and Industry (MITI) might somehow inspire the design of the 
European Industrial Development Authority. Quests for such an 
industrial policy integration and coordination at central European level 
emerge from the need for avoiding and possibly eradicating regional 
differences and disparities in the efficient implementation of designed 
policies. Indeed, there is evidence of a lack of administrative capabilities 
at national and sub-national level that, historically, have prevented 
supported regions to fully exploit financing opportunities, channel 
available funds towards the most remunerative investment projects 
and/or, more radically, to design any effective industrial measure 
(Ederveen et al., 2006; Milio, 2007). Should these inabilities persist, any 
strong EU financial support to region-centric industrial policies would 
likely prove useless. The integration/coordination of regional institutions 
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with a central EU industrial policy authority may at least partially fix past 
implementation problems (see also Barca, 2009 for an articulated 
proposal of a strong multi-level governance scheme for EU cohesion 
policy).  
 
4.1 Some industrial policy targets and measures 
 
The 2013 Innovation Union Scoreboard recognises the deep gap 
dividing peripheral economies, with the partial exception of Ireland, from 
central economies (and from international foreign competitors) as to the 
accumulation of human resources, identified here as a high educational 
level and professional skills attained by the domestic labour force. Even 
worse, from 2008 to 2012, the ongoing crisis has forced most peripheral 
economies to cut higher education funding. Cuts amount to far more than 
10 percent of pre-crisis resources in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and 
Ireland. By contrast, public support of higher education has increased in 
Germany and Austria (European University Association, 2012). It goes 
without saying that the above gap could be expected to widen even 
further with associated consequences in terms of growth and recovery 
potential. Indeed, following Filippetti and Archibugi (2011), the more 
skilled and well prepared a country’s labour force is, the more resilient it 
is to economic downswings.  
The European Commission is well aware of these trends and has 
recently called for an “immediate action to invest more in education and 
training” (European Commission, 2014, p. 16). Consistent with the 
European Commission’s proposal, we suggest EU industrial/cohesion 
funds for peripheral countries with the primary aim of correcting the 
above discrepancy. EU funds to the periphery should support 
expenditures on higher education, scientific and technological education 
above all, so as to favour the larger domestic availability of high-skilled 
workers. In this vein, EU funds should also help to enlarge the domestic 
scientific research community, to strengthen physical infrastructures (say 
labs) devoted to hosting research activities, to finance international 
technology research programs held in peripheral countries, and more 
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activities carried out by universities and governmental-public centres in 
peripheral economies. Such initiatives might have positive side effects on 
the economic performances of peripheral countries insofar as they would 
increase peripheral countries’ high-tech absorption and creation 
capabilities, and stimulate the emergence of a high-tech industry by 
creating more business-friendly environments (see Dosi et al., 2006). 
EU policies that increase the periphery’s endowment of high-skilled 
human resources and make peripheral economies in principle more 
capable to absorb technological knowledge and create innovation are 
obviously appreciable. Nevertheless, they will hardly be effective by 
themselves. Indeed, their pro-growth impact vitally depends on local 
productive systems’ responsiveness to supply-side stimuli. The 
cumulative and localised nature of technology and innovation processes 
indicates such a response might be mild since innovative firms will not 
automatically move to backward economies even in the presence of such 
supply-side incentives. The above EU efforts may be frustrated if better 
scientific, technological and innovation potential capabilities (as 
incorporated in a high-skilled labour force and an increased availability 
of, let’s say, engineers or physicians) do not find adequate employment 
opportunities in the domestic productive system.24 Should such 
employment opportunities be lacking, the above measures may eventually 
give rise to a more intensive periphery-to-centre brain drain, reinforcing 
instead of counteracting centre-periphery technological asymmetries 
(Brussels Think Tank Dialogue, 2013). 
EU industrial policies may avoid such disappointing outcomes by 
specifically dealing with demand-side/supply-side mismatches and 
coordination failures that very often prevent structural changes from 
taking place in relatively backward productive structures. Besides the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
24 See, for instance, Huggins and Johnston (2009) for some evidence on university-
business sector demand-side/supply-side complementarities in the generation of 
innovation and growth opportunities at a regional level in the UK. In particular, the 
authors first note that backward regions heavily depend on local universities as sources of 
knowledge and innovation. Possible beneficial side effects for the local economy, 
however, turn out to be under-exploited (with respect to what has been observed in more 
developed regions) due to the lack of demand for innovation and new technological 
knowledge in the local productive system. 
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supply-side measures considered so far, EU policies should also care 
about tightening productive and innovation linkages inside the 
periphery’s productive and innovation system. There is a wide battery of 
measures that could be deployed to this end.  
First, a considerable body of literature stresses that connections 
between universities, research centres and firms constitute a strong 
positive factor feeding knowledge transfer, industrial clustering and 
cumulative development processes (Cook, 2001; Charles, 2003). D’Este 
et al. (2013) note that the importance of spatial proximity between the 
above institutions becomes even greater in the case of relatively 
backward economies, due to the scarce density in these contexts of 
alternative business sector innovation-production networks. In backward 
regions, firms perceive university-industry interactions as relevant (and 
unique) sources of knowledge accumulation that could not be easily 
found elsewhere in the domestic productive system. In light of these 
facts, EU industrial policies should support the creation of EU-funded 
research centres in the periphery involving universities and private 
enterprises in joint innovation processes. On the one hand, these centres 
may be vehicles of technological knowledge creation and dissemination 
due to researchers’ mobility among research institutions. On the other 
hand, following D’Este et al. (2013), they may act as catalysts of 
production investment aiming to exploit joint public-private applied 
innovations. Besides this, such kinds of centres may perform two 
additional functions. First, they could emerge as autonomous embedded 
public institutions collecting and sharing information on firms’ needs and 
innovation opportunities that are so important to properly implement 
industrial and innovation policies (Rodrik, 2008). Second, they may track 
the effectiveness of R&D efforts in terms of innovations’ applicability to 
commercial uses. 
Second, high-tech firms’ clustering in peripheral countries could be 
favoured by recognising region-specific preferential treatments to new 
and fast-growing innovative businesses. We are thinking here about tax 
and subsidy incentives, but also easy credit (perhaps conveyed through 
the EIB’s operations), which is all the more important should the current 
credit crunch persist. Consistent with the previous point, such measures 
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should aim at increasing the density of peripheral productive and 
innovation systems. Therefore, they might be graduated proportionally to 
the degree of embeddedness in the local productive system of new 
production and innovative activities. Region-specific incentives of this 
kind obviously create distortions in the European common market. This 
fact notwithstanding, their introduction may be justified by 
acknowledging existing productive and technological asymmetries 
between central and peripheral economies. Moreover, they could be 
temporary and subject to conditionality requirements. According to a 
well-known carrot-and-stick argument, public support must be conceded 
and (temporarily) maintained provided that supported firms perform well 
in terms of easily verified targets such as export share in foreign markets 
and/or patented innovations. 
The industrial/technology policy measures discussed so far should 
be conceived of in a more general framework together with other policy 
measures that go beyond the previous focus on peripheral regions’ 
development. Technological and productive upgrading in the Eurozone as 
a whole, and in peripheral countries in particular, may be pursued by 
rediscovering sectoral policies that specifically target the development of 
those industries in which innovation may be deemed to concentrate most 
in the near future (and generate most relevant improvements in social 
welfare). Some recent documents on industrial development by the 
European Commission portray EU institutions moving in this direction. 
Indeed, the European Commission assigns priority to productive and 
innovation efforts concentrated in a set of, at least, six sectors: advanced 
manufacturing, key enabling technologies, bio-based products, clean 
vehicles, sustainable construction and raw materials, the smart grid and 
digital infrastructure. Most of these sectors produce environmentally 
friendly and energy-saving technologies. This appears a far-sighted 
perspective: rising worldwide concern about environmental protection 
seems to suggest that sectors generating such kind of innovations may 
expand rapidly in the near future. 
EU institutions will firstly pursue advances and European leadership 
in the above areas by devoting particular attention to the accumulation of 
technological knowledge and productive competencies specific to the 
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targeted sectors. Alongside supply-side measures, a couple of demand-
side policies are worth considering. On the one hand, following 
Mazzucato (2011), direct EU involvement in the generation and 
procurement of eco-friendly innovations may turn out to be decisive to 
guarantee a European lead in the production of such new technologies. 
On the other hand, EU institutions may artificially create a large and 
attractive market for eco-friendly technologies by imposing stricter 
environmental regulations, raising demand for renewable energy, energy-
saving goods and clean production processes.25 These lines of 
intervention also seem to have recently entered the industrial policy 
toolkit of EU institutions. Now the point is to deploy them with enough 
strength, as has been the case in other foreign countries. 
 
 
5. Final Keynesian remarks 
 
Peripheral euro countries urgently need investment. Increased 
demand injections in the form of higher investment expenditures could 
first act as counter-cyclical forces counteracting the ongoing crisis. More 
importantly, productive investment could help reduce structural and 
technological gaps that still divide peripheral from central economies. 
Actually, should the above structural asymmetries persist, external 
balance constraints would likely impose protracted stagnation on 
peripheral countries. Growth spurts would probably be unsustainable and 
conducive to well-known macroeconomic imbalances and financial 
havoc. 
Peripheral countries’ investment needs call for EU intervention 
insofar as budget restrictions make national governments’ anti-cyclical 
policies inactive. EU intervention should take the form of regionally 
focused industrial policy. Such measures should take inspiration from 
Keynes’s lesson on the intrinsic instability of market economies. First, an 
EU plan for productive investment in the periphery of the eurozone 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
25 Costantini and Crespi (2008) provide empirical evidence at a worldwide level on the 
effectiveness of stringent environmental rules in improving a country’s competitiveness 
and export performance in those same industries.  
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should try to apply Keynes’s ideas of a “somehow comprehensive 
socialisation of investment [as] the only means of securing an 
approximation to full employment” (Keynes, 1972a, p. 378). Second, EU 
industrial measures may try to accomplish with Keynes’s perspective on 
what public intervention aim should be. Indeed, Keynes clearly states in 
The end of the laissez-faire: 
“[t]he most important agenda of the State relates not to those activities 
which private individuals are already fulfilling, but to those functions which 
fall outside the sphere of the individual, to those decisions which are made 
by no one if the State does not make them. The important thing for 
government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to 
do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at 
present are not done at all” (Keynes, 1972b, p. 291). 
Further: 
“I believe that some coordinated act of intelligent judgment is required as 
to the scale on which it is desirable that the community as a whole should 
save, the scale on which these savings should go abroad in the form of 
foreign investments, and whether the present organisation of the investment 
market distributes savings along the most nationally productive channels. I 
do not think that these matters should be left entirely to the chances of 
private judgment and private profits, as they are at present” (Keynes, 
1972b, p. 292, italics added). 
 
Market failures are pervasive in the field of basic research and on the 
financial markets, more so in times of economic contraction and 
widespread uncertainty. Lack of coordination among possibly intertwined 
innovation initiatives severely discourages technological improvements 
and production upgrading in peripheral countries. These constitute 
structural problems that currently dampen development in the periphery 
of the eurozone, and put eurozone survival at risk. EU industrial policy 
should boldly address them in the near future. 
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Appendix A. Macroeconomic converge-divergence trends among 
selected European countries 
 
Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 below provide evidence about comparative 
macroeconomic trends, as well as likely connected external imbalances 
among eurozone countries in the last two decades. 
Figure A.1 portrays eurozone centre-periphery real GDP per capita 
convergence-divergence patterns from 1991 to 2012. In figure A.1 we 
take into account the dynamics of real GDP per capita in the Czech 
Republic and Poland. Germany’s real GDP per capita is taken as 
benchmark. From 1995 until the outbreak of the worldwide financial 
crisis (shown as a grey zone in figure A.1), increasing economic and 
financial integration between European countries, here witnessed by 
converging (and, since 2001, broadly equal) 10-year government bond 
yields (see figure A.2), fed peripheral countries’ catching-up with 
Germany. Irish performance and overtaking of central European countries 
is astonishing. Convergence is far more modest but still significant in the 
case of Spain (since 1995) and Greece (since 2000), as well as in the case 
of the abovementioned Eastern European countries. 
The effects of the ongoing crisis appear clearly from 2007 onwards. 
The disappointing Irish performance with respect to Germany is 
remarkable. Perhaps even more worrisome, newly established divergence 
increasingly divides relatively poor peripheral countries (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy) from Germany and the other central 
economies. At the end of 2012, Greek GDP per capita is less than 50 
percent of the German level (i.e. it is now lower than it was in 2001 at the 
beginning of the common currency experiment). Finally, the Czech 
Republic and, in particular, Poland seem to have been less vulnerable to 
the worldwide financial crisis and to the ensuing sovereign debt crisis 
than peripheral eurozone countries. 
Initial finance-led centre-periphery convergence, when associated to 
persistent centre-periphery asymmetries, has been reflected in widening 
external imbalances (see figure A.3). Relevant current account deficits 
started to emerge in the balance of payments of most peripheral countries 
in the second half of the 1990s (and since the beginning of the 2000s in 
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Ireland). They further increased in the years immediately before the 
2007-2008 financial meltdown (shown as dark grey in figure A.3). The 
worldwide financial crisis has eventually brought to an end irrational 
euphoria on financial markets. Since 2008, painful macroeconomic 
adjustments have been improving peripheral countries’ external 
imbalances at the cost of collapsing domestic markets. 
 
 
 
Figure A.1 – Converge-divergence pattern in real GDP per-capita 
among selected eurozone countries (Germany = 100) 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration of data from UNCTAD. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
R
G
D
P
p
c(
i)
/R
G
D
P
p
c(
G
)
AT
NL
FI
IE
EL
ES
IT
PT
CZ
PL
216  PSL Quarterly Review 
Figure A.2 – Financial integration among eurozone countries and 
interest rate dynamics, 10-year bond interest rates, 1995(Q1)-2012(Q4) 
 
 
Source: author’s representation on the basis of data from OECD. 
 
Figure A.3 – Current account deficits/surplus (% of GDP) in peripheral 
euro countries and in Germany 
 
 
Source: author’s representation based on data from UNCTAD. 
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